Reference of Kashmir Issue to United Nations - "Nehru , Kashmir & Historical Circumstances"- {Part-3}

India adopted Parliamentary democracy & cabinet system .  All the decisions by the Executive are  taken through the Cabinet. The Cabinet system is based on collective responsibility.  So let me, as a student of History, state it upfront that it is wrong to hold any one individual responsible for reference of Kashmir issue to United Nations .  It is important to understand the historical circumstances which made the reference to United Nations inevitable, as explained in part -2 of my blog post. As per Independence Act 1947 passed by the British Parliament, each princely State had to take a decision to either join India or Pakistan.  The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir dithered.  When the situation in J&K got out of control, Maharaja sought help of the Indian Government after signing the instrument of accession.

During September and October 1947, the troops of Maharaja carried out a campaign of sustained harassment, arson, physical violence and genocide against Muslim Kashmiris in Poonch and Southern Jammu.  Maharaja wanted to create a buffer zone of uninhibited land, approximately three miles between Kashmir and Pakistan.  Thousands of refugees mostly Muslim from Jammu began to migrate into Pakistan’s Sialkot District.  In reaction, the Pathans tribesmen raised by former guard Khursid Anwar and Afridis and Masoods from the North-West frontier started gathering on the Kashmir border.  The tribesmen started moving towards Srinagar sacking towns and villages on their way, which had been disserted by Maharaja’s Army.  V.P. Menon was sent  to speak to Maharajah and his Prime Minister.  Simultaneously, Nehru cabled to Attlee in London “I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir and this emergency is not designed in any way to influence, the State to accede to India”.  Meanwhile, the Maharaja had deserted his capital and lost control of his State.

 The British High Commissioner in Pakistan telegraphed urgently to London that India should not accept Kashmiris accession without a plebiscite, but it was too late.  Nehru and Mountbatten accepted the accession, and prepared to fly Indian troops to Kashmir.  Mountbatten, though he did not advise military operation, became increasingly desperate to rein in Nehru .  At a Defence Committee meeting on 4th November, 1947, Mountbatten advised strongly against sending India’s  troops into Muslim areas, Mirpur and Poonch, even for liberation purposes. 

However,  Mountbatten was not  around to supervise the Indian Army at this crucial point for he had already accepted invitation to fly back Britain with Edwina for his Nephew’s royal weeding.  With Mountbatten away   Nehru’s first action was to take his long threatened trip of Kashmir.  On 12th November, he addressed a meeting at Sri Nagar “I plead before you on behalf of myself and the people of India that we, India and Kashmir, shall ever remain together”.  Mountbatten flew back India on 24th December, 1947. 

But much had happened during Mountbatten's vacation.  Liyaquat Ali Khan stated that Pakistan wanted to refer the Kashmir issue to the United Nations.  Jawaharlal Nehru charged high Pakistani officials with inciting the tribesmen in Kashmir.

  On Kashmir, Nehru’s attitude was hardening and he was losing interest in  holding a plebiscite.   Liyaquat Ali Khan through British advisors (Symond & Alexander) suggested that all non-Kashmiri troops should be removed from Kashmir and replaced by a temporary United Nations Government, pending a plebiscite. 

Mountbatten, too was beginning to think about calling in the international arbitrator.  When Liyaquat and Nehru met on 8th December, 1947, they argued for five hours’ trade before pained Mountbatten interrupted them and begged them to telegraph to the United Nations Security Council and got a team sent over immediately.  Nehru was reluctant to accept the United Nations involvement.  Just a week before the U.N. had voted to partition Palestine between Arab Jews.  Trouble had flared immediately in Damascus, Tel Aviv etc  . Nehru did not see UN’s roles of peace keeping of supervising of plebiscite were relevant until there was a peace to keep.  In the meantime, a reference to the United Nations would involve admitting that the situation was one of the war between India and Pakistan.  His attitude came in for much criticism.

 In a moment of frustration , the British High Commissioner  at Karachi wrote  “We seem to be faced with a choice between what may be loosely described as natural justice and the appeasement of one man who, since himself as a Kashmiri Pandit, is blinded to realities by means passionately involved.”  For this, the High Commissioner was reprimanded for Attlee.

 Mountbatten presided over another hopeless meeting in New Delhi on 21st and 22nd December, 1947 at which Liyaquat and Nehru reached a complete deadlock.  After sustained lobbying, Mountbatten persuaded Nehru to refer the Kashmir problem to United Nations- a concession which he considered a great achievement, for “Nehru has been as temperamental and difficult over the Kashmir issue as he had ever known him”. 

Attlee on the other hand sent sternly worded message to Nehru telling him not to move forces into Pakistan, even if he thought such an action to constitute as defence. While these were going on, India began to drop bombs on Pathan tribes along the 500 miles of Kashmir, South-West. 

Finally, on 31st December, 1947, India gave in to Mountbatten‘s persuasion and instructed the Indian Ambassador in Washington to submit an appeal to the United Nations Security Council. 

Importance of Sheikh Abdullah

It has to be understood that without Shiekh Abdullah’s support , who was a popular leader of Kashmir, India would not have had the moral grounds .

“Give army, take accession and give whatever powers you want to give to the popular party (National Conference headed by Sheikh Abdullah), but the army must fly to Srinagar this evening, otherwise I will go and negotiate terms with Mr (Mohammad Ali) Jinnah (the Pakistan leader) as the city must be saved,” beseeched Jammu and Kashmir’s then Prime Minister Mehar Chand Mahajan to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and home minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel.

It was October 26, 1947, and the meeting in Nehru’s residence would eventually decide the future of Jammu and Kashmir. Angered by Mahajan’s threat, Nehru told the J&K PM, “Mahajan, Go away.”

As Mahajan got up to leave the room, Patel detained him and said in his ear, “Of course, Mahajan, you are not going to Pakistan.”

Mahajan’s threat to go to Lahore to sign deal with Jinnah hung in the air; then a piece of paper was passed to the Prime Minister.

“Sheikh Abdullah, who was staying in the Prime Minister’s house, was overhearing the talks. Sensing a critical moment, he sent in a slip of paper to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister read it and said that what I (Mahajan) was saying was also the view of Sheikh Sahib,” recollects Mahajan in his book “looking Back” (first published in 1963) . “His (Nehru’s) attitude changed completely.”

Abdullah, who wanted to head a civilian government in the state, was also totally against Jinnah and opposed to the idea of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.

Giving the background of the crucial October 26 meeting when the destiny of Kashmir was decided, Mahajan wrote that by October 24, 1947, tribal raiders from Pakistan had reached the borders of Srinagar.

In the summer of 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh had toyed with the idea of remaining independent, a kind of Switzerland of Asia, but with Pakistan showing its hand by organising a raid on the state, the Dogra King was left with no option but to accede to India. He dispatched his deputy Prime Minister Ram Lal Batra to Delhi with the proposal of accession.

Singh sent two personal letters as well for Prime Minister Nehru and his deputy Sardar Patel, seeking military help. But despite Batra reaching Delhi, there was no comforting sign of Indian military landing in Srinagar.

Meanwhile, Jinnah had decided to celebrate Eid at Srinagar. Mahajan writes that Jinnah ordered his British commander-in-chief to march two brigades of the Pakistani army into J&K on October 27, one from Rawalpindi and the other from Sialkot.

The Sialkot brigade was to take Jammu and capture Hari Singh while the Rawalpindi brigade was to reach Srinagar but the British officer refused to march the troops of one dominion to fight those of another dominion (of the UK) without consulting the supreme commander of both the dominions.

Then came the events of October 26.

The Supreme Commander Claude Auchinleck told Jinnah on October 26 that Kashmir had decided to accede to India, which therefore had the right to send troops at Maharaja’s request. 

In a telegram to the PM of Pakistan, Pandit Nehru said, “Kashmir's accession to India was accepted by us at the request of the Maharaja's government and the most numerously representative popular organization in the state which is predominantly Muslim. Even then it was accepted on condition that as soon as law and order had been restored, the people of Kashmir would decide the question of accession. It is open to them to accede to either Dominion then.” (Telegram No. 255 dated 31 October, 1947).

The next morning, the Indian army landed in Srinagar following the offer of accession as well as the Maharaja’s promise to consider handing over power to Sheikh Abdullah.

A few days later, as per the desire of Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah was sworn in as head of emergency administration and few months later as the Prime Minister of the state.

Indian Constituent Assembly in 1949 adopted Article 370 of the Constitution, ensuring a special status and internal autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir with Indian jurisdiction in Kashmir limited to the three areas: defence, foreign affairs and communications.

Source  : (a) “Looking Back “ by Mehar Chand Mahajan {A notable lawyer in pre-independence Punjab, Mahajan was appointed a judge of the Punjab high court in 1943. He was a member of the Radcliffe Commission, formed to demarcate the boundary between India and Pakistan following the partition and also of the Royal India Navy Mutiny Commission of 1948. Most importantly, he was J&K’s Prime Minister between October 1947 and March of the following year when Sheikh Abdullah succeeded him. Later, Mahajan became a Supreme Court judge and retired as the Chief Justice of India in 1954.} (b)  Indian Summer by Alex Von Tunzelmann (c)